

Economic bibtex (bst) Styles: What They Actually Look Like

October 9, 2017

It is sometimes inconvenient that there is so little information out there about what LaTeX bibliography styles actually look like. This is especially true when it comes to communities in which using LaTeX is not yet well-established, such as economists. A CTAN package comprising some economics styles was provided by Arne Henningsen¹ some years ago; it contains styles for AER format, CJE format, Taylor and Francis format, and 15 others. Here is what they look like.

¹See <https://ctan.org/tex-archive/biblio/bibtex/contrib/economic> or <https://sourceforge.net/projects/economtex/>

1 aer Style (aer.bst)

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3 agecon Style (agecon.bst)

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7 `ecca` Style (`ecca.bst`)

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14 jss2 Style (jss2.bst)

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16 regstud Style (regstud.bst)

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18 worlddev Style (worlddev.bst)

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